Basic Prerequisites: 03 · Growth & Optimality and 05 · Ruin & Drawdown.


1. Intuition & Practical Objective

Page 03 proved full Kelly is growth-optimal. This page confronts the cost: full Kelly is aggressive, and anything past it is ruinous. The objective is to make the risk profile concrete and turn it into a sizing rule change.

Three facts drive practice:

  1. The law. Half Kelly () keeps of the growth rate at half the volatility. The first 25% of growth you give up buys a 50% cut in risk - an extraordinary asymmetry in the risk dimension even though growth is symmetric around .
  2. Overbetting risk is not symmetric. Because is concave and flat near the top, betting costs more growth than betting , and the drawdown cost of overbetting compounds with quadratic volatility. Past the critical fraction the growth rate goes negative: ruin is near-certain with a positive edge.
  3. Ruin and drawdown have quantitative laws. Any fixed-fraction bettor runs a constant-proportional-betting random walk, so drawdowns follow an explicit distribution (Thorp §6; the ergodicity folder’s ruin page); full Kelly has a large, fixed drawdown law that the median investor finds unacceptable.

Takeaway. Fractional Kelly is not a hedge against being wrong about - it is the rational response to the asymmetry that overbetting is punished far harder than underbetting, in a world where are estimated. The standard practitioner rule: bet at half Kelly () to start, de-rate further when parameter uncertainty is high.


2. Mathematical Ground Truth & Derivations

2.1 The fractional-Kelly growth and risk

With :

Growth is a quadratic that is flat at the top; risk is linear in . Hence half Kelly: , risk . Double Kelly (): , risk . The ratio of return to risk is monotonically worse the further you scale above .

2.2 The critical fraction and certain ruin

For the even-money game (), solves , i.e. . For the log-growth is negative, and by the law of large numbers the time-average wealth drifts to zero almost surely. Because , a sizing error turns a profitable edge into a guaranteed-loss strategy - not a riskier one, a losing one.

2.3 Drawdown law (continuous)

For continuous Kelly, the drawdown from a peak follows an exponential-law tail controlled by the growth-rate-to-variance ratio. The key qualitative result: even at full Kelly the expected maximum drawdown is large, so a full-Kelly investor must tolerate 50%+ drawdowns as routine - a “growth-optimal but stomach-churning” profile.


3. Computational Implementation - fractional Kelly, ruin, and drawdowns in simulation

Stdlib only: simulate fixed-fraction betting at half / full / double Kelly and measure three outcomes - median terminal wealth, probability of ruin (account < 10% of start), and average maximum drawdown from the running peak.

The pattern is unmistakable. Double Kelly (, right at the critical ): half the terminal wealth of half-Kelly earnings, 22% of accounts ruined, and terminal drawdown 100%. Full Kelly: 0.9% ruin but 99% max-drawdown. Half Kelly: zero ruin in 20,000 paths and still compounds positively. The overbet is strictly worse on every risk metric - more ruin and lower median wealth - which is exactly the failure mode of page 05. Fractional Kelly is the only one of the three that is actually deployable.


4. Failure Modes & First-Principles Breakdowns

  1. “Kelly says bet 22%.” On an estimated edge, is a fiction; betting the estimated full Kelly on a slightly-wrong lands you at the true optimum - straddling with double-Kelly ruin probabilities (see the page 05 overbetting demo).
  2. Treating drawdown as a nuisance. Full Kelly’s ~99% max drawdown is not a bug - it is the growth-optimal risk profile. Funds and individuals almost universally de-rate because the median path of full Kelly is brutally volatile.
  3. Believing “geometrically” doubles returns. The growth curve is concave: beyond you gain nothing and lose risk. There is no compensation for overbetting.
  4. Ignoring the continuous/leverage case. In securities, can exceed 1 (leverage); fractional Kelly then governs how much leverage, and over-leverage near in the continuous case means forced liquidation at drawdowns, compounding the ruin.

5. References

  • Thorp, Edward O.: The Kelly Criterion in Blackjack, Sports Betting, and the Stock Market (2006)
  • MacLean, Ziemba & Blazenko: Growth versus Security in Dynamic Investment Analysis, Management Science 38(11) (1992)
  • MacLean, Thorp & Ziemba (eds.): The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Criterion (2011) - “bad properties of Kelly” (aggressiveness, drawdown).
  • Browne, S.: The Return on Investment from Proportional Portfolio Strategies and the Optimal Investment Horizon (1999)

6. Connected Graph Bridges