Basic Prerequisites: VaR & Expected Shortfall (why risk measures work in probability) and Linear Algebra (covariance matrices, the quadratic form ). (these are the folder-level prerequisites for pages 02–06; page 01 states its own, smaller, entry requirements)


1. Intuition & Practical Objective

VaR and Expected Shortfall ask “how bad is the normal tail?” - they estimate a quantile of a fitted or historical loss distribution, then treat that number as the risk. Stress testing asks a completely different question: “what happens to this firm if the unforecastable happens?” It deliberately throws away the probability distribution and instead subjects the portfolio to a deterministic shock - a replay of 2008, or a hypothetical “equities −40% and credit +500bp at the same time.”

Why bother, if we already have VaR/ES? Because probability is the wrong ruler for the rare tail. A 99% VaR computed from history is silent about the crisis day that has not happened yet: the 2008 loss in several books was many multiples of their VaR. Stress testing is the bridge from risk measurement (how much could we lose under a model) to survival analysis (can the firm keep operating when the model’s assumptions break). It is also the mechanism regulators use - CCAR/DFAST, EBA, and the FRTB’s stressed Expected Shortfall all force banks to compute capital against a stressed, not a “normal,” loss.

The one-sentence essence. “A risk measure tells you a number; a stress test tells you a path. VaR/ES ask ‘how bad is the usual tail,’ stress testing asks ‘what breaks the firm’ - and because tail probability is unknowable, the answer to the second question cannot come from a distribution, only from deliberately engineered shocks.”


2. Mathematical Ground Truth & Derivations

Quick-Reference Lookup (job #1). The formulas below are transcribed from the verified corpus - FRTB (BIS 2019, d457), Hull OFOD Ch 22, McNeil–Frey–Embrechts QRM Ch 13, Schuermann (2014) - and the numbers in the check column were re-executed and reproduced exactly (see §3).

Notation: portfolio value, sensitivity (delta) to risk factor , factor shock, factor covariance, standardized factor shock vector, capital to breach, correlation.

QuantityFormulaVerified check
Factor-model P&L1987: $ on the example fund
Normal 1-day 99% VaR (single asset)
Normal ES @ 99% ES vs VaR
Reverse stress test (min shock to breach) s.t. normal corr: ; stressed corr:
Min breach magnitude$/√258.6 = 1.866 σ
FRTB stressed ES (capital measure), ratio floored at 1
1-yr 99% VaR, 2-asset ,

Scenario catalog (stylized calibration used throughout this folder; shocks are scenario inputs, not point forecasts):

ScenarioEquityCredit spreadRatesTypical stress lesson
1987 Black Monday (1 day)+100bp−50bpsingle-day jump breaks hedging
1998 LTCM / Russia+250bp−150bpflight to quality: credit blows out as rates rally
2008 GFC / Lehman (to peak-to-trough)+500bp−100bpsimultaneous multi-asset collapse, corr
2020 COVID+300bp−50bpliquidity vacuum: even “safe” assets sold

3. Computational Implementation - the scenario engine

This runs on the standard library only and reproduces every verified number above: deterministic factor shocks are just weighted sums, so no numpy is needed.

A 47M under the 2008 replay - a single deterministic calculation, no distribution required. The full machinery (sensitivity grids, scenario matrices, reverse stress, correlation breakdown, macro projection) lives in the sub-pages below.


4. Failure Modes & First-Principles Breakdowns

Hub signposts - the folder’s failure-mode analysis lives in 05 · Failure Modes & Practice. In one line each:

  1. Scenario selection bias - the result is decided by which scenarios you chose to run, not by data; two defensible scenario sets can reach opposite conclusions.
  2. Stress has no probability - a scenario carries no likelihood, so you cannot aggregate, backtest, or rank scenarios the way you can VaR exceptions.
  3. Correlation breakdown - the biggest tail losses come from diversification disappearing (correlations → 1), which is exactly the input most models freeze at “normal” values.

5. References

  • BCBS (BIS): Minimum Capital Requirements for Market Risk (FRTB, Jan 2019, d457)
  • BCBS (BIS): Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision (2009, CN14)
  • Federal Reserve: 2025 Stress Test Scenarios (CCAR/DFAST)
  • Schuermann, Til: Stress Testing Banks, IJCB 10(2):95–154 (2014)
  • Hull, John C.: Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives (11th ed.)
  • McNeil, Frey & Embrechts: Quantitative Risk Management (2015)
  • Quagliariello (ed.) (2009), Bellini (2016)

6. Connected Graph Bridges

Beginner: start at 01 · Practitioner: start at 05